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Abstract
Crisis communication has been a regular topic in Media & 
Communication Studies and in Journalism Studies in Norway for many 
years. This article outlines experiences at Oslo and Akershus University 
College of Applied Sciences (HiOA) with taking part in two large-scale 
anti-terror exercises in 2006 and 2012 in and around the Norwegian 
capital Oslo. The main organizers were The Norwegian Directorate 
for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning and The Norwegian 
Police Directorate. Students from The Department of Journalism 
and Media Studies at HiOA staffed online (intranet) newspapers to 
simulate “media pressure” on 40–50 key institutions with a total of 
4,000-5,000 staff from all management levels right up to the Prime 
Minister’s office. The analysis and findings confirm that from the 
vantage point of a tertiary education institution, the benefits of taking 
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part by far outweighed some drawbacks. Specifically, the exercises 
a) gave students first-hand experience in crisis communication and 
crisis management; b) have improved conceptually and take into 
account relevant crisis communication theory; c) reflect that Norway 
still has to come to terms with the tragic events of 22 July 2011 when 
77 Norwegians were murdered by a Norwegian terrorist; d) suggest 
that many of the 40–50 organizations singled out to be trained in the 
exercises are still inadequately prepared for terror strikes. 
K e y w o r d s :  extended classroom, internships, anti-terror 
exercises, crisis communication 
Educator-employer cooperation
In Norway, tertiary educational institutions interact with the 
labour market and potential employers in a variety of ways. By law, 
the governing boards of all tertiary education facilities have external 
representatives from the public and private sectors who are supposed 
to represent the interests of the tax payers. Furthermore, evaluation and 
accreditation procedures take account of the needs of society and the job 
market, in addition to factors such as student grades, study programmes, 
student opinion, scientific publishing, staff and curricula development, 
level of internationalization and scholarly ranking etc. In Norway these 
factors are important for all tertiary education institutions, which are 
all governed by one single law for universities and university colleges 
(NOKUT 2013). While all teaching is supposed to be research-based, 
irrespective of institutional status, universities tend to prioritize research 
more than teaching. Conversely, university colleges of applied science 
are more preoccupied with teaching than research, especially teaching 
that involves networking and interaction with public institutions and 
private sector enterprises. Three examples of such networking stressed 
in this article are a) joint projects, b) inviting practitioners to meet and 
lecture students and c) securing internships for students in the public and 
private sectors. As this article seeks to demonstrate, this type of educator-
employer cooperation or what we could call “the extended classroom”, 
is instrumental in providing students with real-life experience and job 
opportunities, and it also benefits employers.
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Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences (HiOA) 
is Norway’s largest state university college. With 17,000 students and 
2,500 academic and non-academic staff, it is organized in 4 faculties 
and two specialist centres, offering a variety of 56 BA, 35 MA and 
6 PhD programmes. Close links with the labour market and a broad 
spectrum of professions characterize HiOA, where internships are 
seen as the interface between education and professional life. This 
strategy will continue when HiOA in 2015 applies for full university 
status (HiOA 2013). 
The Department of Journalism and Media Studies offers BA 
programmes in Journalism, Photo journalism and Media and 
communication studies plus an MA programme in Journalism. The 
two undergraduate programmes in Journalism and Photo journalism 
can be traced back to the 1950s and 1980s, respectively. Each year 70 
journalism students and 12 photo journalism students are accepted. 
Internships have always been regarded as vital and are compulsory 
in both programmes. Journalism students spend 10 weeks (15 
ECTS) in the last part of their 3rd semester as interns, whereas photo 
journalism students devote their entire 5th semester (14 weeks or 30 
ECTS) to internships in Norwegian newspapers and media houses. A 
tariff agreement between The Norwegian Journalist Association and 
The Federation of Media Enterprises / Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprises, guarantees that student interns get 40% of the starting 
salary of new journalists / photo journalists. 
Media and communication studies, which are the focus of this 
article since it is the main responsibility of the author, handle 
internships somewhat differently. The first batch of students from 
the undergraduate programme in Media and communication studies 
received their diplomas in 2007. During their 3-year programme, 
students have an option to spend 11 weeks as interns in a variety of 
public institutions or private enterprises. 2 weeks are part of their 5th 
semester and a 15 ECTS optional course, while 9 weeks take place 
in their final 6th semester as a 15 ECTS optional course, totalling 30 
ECTS over two semesters. Over the last 7 years approximately 150 
internship agreements with institutional or corporate partners have 
been made, including The Police Directorate and The Directorate 
101
for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning. These are informal 
agreements and the students are in most cases not paid. They are 
also encouraged to seek out an internship that interests them and 
matches their qualifications. In student evaluations, the internships, 
albeit optional, are seen as the most important part of the entire 
undergraduate programme. This is the interface between education 
and professional life; internships give students an invaluable 
opportunity to get first-hand experience, contacts and relevant 
media productions for their student portfolios which can lead to later 
employment. Host institutions are also overwhelmingly positive. 
From the host institutions’ point of view, the practical drawbacks of 
allocating people and resources to mentoring a student are more than 
offset by the new ideas, impulses and updated knowledge that young 
student interns often bring in with them. 
This is especially the case when it comes to social media where young 
students as a rule are very skilled. Although unemployment figures in 
Norway for several years have been among the lowest in Europe, job 
announcements can attract hundreds of applicants. To the employer, 
the cost of job announcements, shortlisting and interviewing can be 
considerable, as compared with recruitment through internships. In 
the labour market, legislation designed to protect the rights of job 
seekers (The Discrimination Act, 2006) and employees (The Working 
Environment Act, 1977) mean that internships can be a more efficient 
and informal way of vetting candidates for later employment, and at 
the same time adding to the employer’s earned reputation, branding 
and CSR. 
Anti-terror exercises
Norwegian authorities, normally the police, regularly organize 
anti-terror exercises in different parts of the country to improve the 
capacity of key institutions and staff to handle terror situations. In 
order to not confuse or frighten the public, such exercises with their 
simulated events are often staged in remote locations, and are always 
announced to the public well in advance. These exercises get some 
coverage in local print and broadcast media, but an effort is made to 
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draw a clear distinction line between exercise and reality. Participants 
in exercises who are visible to the public e.g. all wear distinctive 
yellow vests marked “Exercise”. Integral to such exercises are “media 
games”, where online (intranet) newspapers are set up by the police 
and staffed with students from Journalism studies and/or Media and 
communication studies from different educational institutions. 
These subjects are taught at several of Norway’s seven universities 
and 26 university colleges around the country. These online exercise 
newspapers are supposed to simulate real-life press coverage and 
exert “media pressure” on participants. The two exercises described 
in this article which took place in 2006 and 2012, were exceptional 
since they were located in and around the capital Oslo and were large-
scale. A total of 260 students and 10 teachers from The Department 
of Journalism and Media Studies at Oslo and Akershus University 
College of Applied Sciences were involved. 
A key issue for the second exercise in 2012 was the expected impact 
of the national tragedy of 22 July 2011, when a Norwegian terrorist 
had killed 77 people in Oslo city centre and on the island of Utøya just 
outside Oslo. 
Exercise Oslo, 17–18 October 2006
As I have explained in more detail elsewhere (Vaagan 2008), 
“Exercise Oslo 2006” was the largest civilian-led crisis exercise ever 
in Norway. The scale of the exercise was influenced by the terrorist 
bombings in Madrid in March 2004 and in London in July 2005. In 
addition, the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in December 2004 when 
84 Norwegian tourists in Thailand died, also played in. Exercise Oslo 
was staged in Oslo and involved 50 key organizations and 4,000 
participants, from operative personnel to strategic decision-makers 
at ministry level. The exercise took place over a 30-hour period 17-
18 October 2006, and was organized by The Directorate for Civil 
Protection and Emergency Planning on the instructions of The Ministry 
of Justice and the Police. The main objective was to prepare Norwegian 
society to handle terrorist strikes. A small part of the exercise involved 
a “media game”: An online (intranet) newspaper Oslo News was set 
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up by The Police Directorate, and staffed by voluntary participants, 
both professional journalists from the Norwegian State Broadcasting 
Corporation (NRK), and students and teachers in both Media and 
communication studies and Journalism studies from what was then 
Oslo University College. In August 2011, Oslo University College 
merged with Akershus University College to become the present Oslo 
and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences. 
The news room was located at The Police University College. A 
total of 108 articles on many aspects of the exercise, written mostly 
by students and all by-lined, were published. The terror scenario 
envisaged a fictional Islamist group controlled from an imaginary 
country Tagistan striking against civilian infrastructure targets in 
Norway, echoing the attacks in Madrid and London 2004-2005. The 
fictional bombs were set off as a reaction to Norwegian involvement 
in oil and gas exploration in Tagistan. 
Other members of the exercise included The Norwegian Police 
Directorate, the Directorate for Health and Social Affairs, the City 
of Oslo, and the County Governor of Oslo and Akershus as well as 
many sub-units especially in health and transport. Interestingly, the 
Norwegian armed forces were not involved. In Norway, there is a 
constitutional ban on using armed forces against the civilian population 
and there has therefore historically been a certain distance and lack 
of cooperation between the police and armed forces. The police is 
extremely reluctant to ask for assistance from the armed forces in the 
event of emergencies or crises. This became evident during the tragic 
events of 22 July 2011 described later. An inter-ministerial crisis group 
also took part, reporting to the Prime Minister’s Office. In addition, the 
British, Danish, Finnish, Icelandic and Pakistani embassies in Oslo also 
participated, reflecting the increasingly heterogeneous demography of 
Oslo. Basic information about the exercise for the public was also made 
available in English, Somali, Urdu and Arabic. 
From Oslo University College, 120 first-, second- and third-year 
students in Media and communication studies as well as 70 first-
year students in Journalism studies plus 9 teachers from both fields 
volunteered to staff and help run the newspaper. Also, four visiting 
students in Media and information management from Hogeschool 
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van Amsterdam joined in as part of the international group handling 
relations with embassies and the foreign press.
Students and teachers worked in shifts of 8 hours. Some students 
worked one shift while most teachers had two shifts. Meals were 
served in the refectory. At any given time there were 4 teachers and 
about 40 students available. About 40 of the first-year journalism 
students kept up “media pressure” on key stakeholders by telephone. 
The news desk was headed by a managing editor, alternately from 
The Norwegian State Broadcasting Corporation and Oslo University 
College. The news desk was staffed mainly by students from 
Journalism studies and some students in Media and communication 
studies, plus supervisors from the police. Most of the Media and 
communication students acted as field reporters, visiting the sites of 
the bombings, hospitals, key infrastructure points and attending press 
conferences. They had their own cameras and were given a limited 
number of mobile phones by The Police Directorate. They wrote their 
stories at a variety of locations. The author worked as group leader 
and as managing editor on one shift. Most of the 108 articles that 
were published were in Norwegian and only 10% had photos. Many of 
the articles were short news items of 50–100 words or less. Some by-
lines had one author, others two, while some were anonymous press 
releases. In several cases, police officers in the newsroom sanctioned 
or vetoed article content, so there was little editorial freedom.
F i g u r e  1 .  Photo of bombed-out bus 
(Courtesy of  The Directorate for Civil Protection 
and Emergency Planning)
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Well in advance of the exercise, Oslo University College cautioned 
the organizers against using religious or ethnic stereotypes in 
preparing threat scenarios. At the time, minorities constituted 9% of 
the Norwegian population, and 25% in the capital. As one of the largest 
tertiary educational institutions in the capital, we had (and have) a 
significant proportion of minority students. The organizers to some 
extent complied with our wish. Although the background scenario 
of the police was restrained and without direct reference to Islam or 
Muslims, it nonetheless did suggest risk and threat perceptions based 
on a stereotype of the Muslim terrorist in conflict with the secular, 
affluent West. This stereotype was muted in Oslo News but clearly 
present in text and footage provided by the organizers and more 
surprisingly by The Norwegian State Broadcasting Corporation. 
All participating students and staff were given a questionnaire by 
DSB to fill in, and the responses formed part of a 47-page evaluation. 
Overall, the exercise was described as very useful, including some 
shortcomings in information sharing among key institutions. The 
report was primarily concerned with cooperation among the major 
participants, but failed to mention the participation of 200 students 
and teachers from Oslo University College. I therefore later sent DSB 
a draft version of an article (Vaagan 2008) which summarized the 
viewpoints of our institution, based on informal discussions with 
teachers and students. DSB had no comments to the draft article. Our 
viewpoints were as follows:
● It was a very useful experience in crisis communication for 
students and staff.
● There was a good co-operative spirit and good relations esp. with 
The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning and key 
police personnel.
● All students and staff appreciated the diploma they received from 
The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning.
● The 120 first-, second- and third-year students in Media and 
communication studies benefited from acting as journalists (and four 
as desk editors). These are tasks they normally do not do.
● The 70 first-year students in Journalism studies benefited less, 
since they to some extent already knew the job and judged acting 
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as journalists less interesting. They were e.g. not encouraged to 
use independent sources, as they are trained to do, but had to limit 
themselves to predefined sources. There were limitations on uploading 
photos and Oslo News had no possibilities to receive MMS photos.
● The 9 teachers working as either group leaders or editors thought 
the exercise provided valuable training for the students, and also an 
interesting experience as far as their own roles were concerned. 
● The 9 teachers also believed editorial work and running the 
newspaper in some cases were hampered by non-professionals from 
the police, by limitations on editorial independence and journalistic 
freedom. 
● Most of the 9 teachers believed that in the event of a participating 
in a new future exercise, more effort must be given to involve the 
media, press and public. 
One factor which only became apparent later, was that one of the 
Norwegian students in Media and communication studies who had 
taken part in the exercise, Eira Kamvåg, was recruited by DSB. She 
moved to the city of Tønsberg approximately 100 kilometres south of 
Oslo where DSB has its headquarters and she continued working with 
DSB for several years. 
Exercise Bull, 30 October – 1 November 2012
Exercise Bull was supposed to have taken place in late 2011 in 
Oslo, and was the first exercise in the capital since Exercise Oslo six 
years earlier. Once again Oslo and Akershus University College of 
Applied Sciences was among the participants. But the tragic events of 
22 July 2011 when 77 people were murdered in and around Oslo by 
the terrorist Anders Behring Breivik forced the police to postpone the 
exercise. When it finally did take place in late 2012, there were several 
similarities but also noticeable changes compared with Exercise 
Oslo six years earlier. Since 2007 when the first batch of Media and 
communication students graduated, both The Police Directorate 
and The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning 
had joined the internship programme of Media and communication 
studies. Several of our students had done internships with these 
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organizations. We have therefore come to know each other quite well 
and a longstanding educator-employer relationship has developed 
which all sides are content with. Also, as part of the preparatory 
lecturing and preparation, students received a copy of the Police 
Directorate’s handbook on crisis communication (Politiet 2010). 
Although not taking part in this exercise, The Directorate for Civil 
Protection and Emergency Planning in 2012 gave its regular spring 
lecture on crisis communication to the students and demonstrated 
the organization´s new crisis website kriseinfo.no set up in January 
2012. Also missing this time was The Norwegian State Broadcasting 
Corporation, which nonetheless of course did report about the 
exercise, although it was not involved as it had been in 2006. But 
many of the other key organizations were the same.
This was not a civilian-led exercise. The Police Directorate and not 
The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, was 
now in charge and the Norwegian military were actively involved. 
This was a major difference from 2006. The overall purpose, however, 
was very similar: to train around 40 key institutions and 5,000 staff 
from all management levels right up to the Prime Minister’s Office, at 
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F i g u r e  2 .  Police special forces storming 
airplane with suspected hijackers (Courtesy 
of The Police Directorate)
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the national and regional level in Oslo and Akershus to handle terror 
situations, including Oslo Airport Gardermoen and adjacent local 
authorities in Romerike. The media game participants included Oslo 
and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences but also to some 
extent students in Journalism from Volda University College and 
pupils from Breivika secondary school in Tromsoe. They also provided 
“media pressure” by telephone and, in the case of Volda University 
College, by supplying the news desk with articles for publishing. 
As in 2006, the threat scenario was prepared by The Police 
Security Service, and kept secret from most participants until shortly 
before the exercise started. It then became clear that a fictional 
terrorist organization Democratic Sealand located somewhere in 
the Middle East had threatened NATO member countries involved 
in Afghanistan and Libya with reprisal attacks. As in 2006, but less 
pronounced, Islam and Muslim terrorists were again the stereotyped 
perpetrators. 
This time the police stressed that the exercise was to be the 
“sharpest” ever, including two simulated plane hijackings at Oslo 
Airport Gardermoen. The Police Directorate had also improved its 
intranet newspaper so that videos and photos now could easily be 
uploaded and integrated in cross-media content. All material was 
this time in Norwegian only. With regard to student participation, our 
Department of Journalism and Media Studies had decided that for 
practical reasons only 2nd and 3rd year students – 70 in all - in Media 
and communication studies would be involved, along with 2 teachers. 
In addition, one teacher from Journalism studies took part on an 
observer basis. The students included a visiting Russian journalism 
student from the MGIMO University in Moscow attending a Media 
and communication course who role-played as a RIA Novosti foreign 
correspondent. The present author was the main organizer from our 
institution’s side. The news desk was set up in a computer room at 
Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences, not at The 
Police University College as in 2006. Also, this time there were no 
police officers in the newsroom or working on the news desk. This 
was a major change and assured that this time there would be full 
editorial freedom.
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The exercise started around 09:00 on 30 October and ended at 
midnight 1 November. We worked in 5-hour shifts, both in the newsroom 
staffed by 3rd year students (about 20), and the 50 field reporters which 
were 2nd year students. The students working in the newsroom elected 
their desk leader, and the field reporters chose their own shift leaders. All 
students had been equipped with smartphones by the Police Directorate, 
a clear improvement on Exercise Oslo six years earlier. Meals were paid 
for by the Police Directorate and delivered by outside suppliers. 
A total of 144 news items were published, of which approximately 
30% had either photos, videos or links to videos on YouTube or Vimeo. 
The desk set up several g-mail accounts for incoming traffic from field 
reporters and others. In addition, the Police Directorate provided a series 
of news releases, photos, videos and tips. All phone calls and e-mails 
with sources and contact persons had to be preceded by the warning 
“Exercise” in order to avoid possible misunderstandings. All field 
reporters wore yellow vests marked “Exercise” for easy identification. 
All news items were by-lined and copies could be taken 
by students for their own portfolios. These are potentially 
useful for subsequent job applications and interviews. Below 
is an example of the type of article that was published. 
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leader Henrikke Vågen (left) and shift leader Janni Frederiksen Kalafatis 
(right) (Photo: R.Vaagan)
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Hijacking averted.                                                   30.10.12, 
18:32 hrs
Drama as police special forces storm passenger airliner  
 
By Anne-Margrethe Malkenes Mathiesen, Deniz Feta and Linn-Mari 
Kolstad Velo
Drama 
Passenger Bernt Kibsgård witnessed dramatic scenes as police special 
forces stormed the airliner he was in with 90 passengers. 
— Our departure was delayed several times before armed police 
special forces suddenly stormed the plane. I didn’t see anything 
suspicious before the police entered. I had fallen asleep when burst 
into the cabin shouting. In an attempt to document events, Kibsgård 
reached for his mobile phone, which alarmed the police. He was 
detained, searched and interrogated. — As we were being evacuated 
from the plane, one passenger tripped and cut his arm on a seat. He 
was later assisted by paramedics.  
— Do you know why the police stormed the plane? 
— No, but I saw that several other passengers in addition to myself 
were detained. I was searched several times by the police which made 
me feel targeted, but they were only doing their job.  
 
Ordered to leave plane 
— There were 10–12 armed policemen in combat suits who stormed 
the plane and ordered the passengers to fold their hands above their 
heads, lean forward and look down, recounts Alice Marie Johansen, 
who was also onboard the plane. She saw that persons behaving 
suspiciously, e.g. by reaching for items in their pockets, were detained 
and interrogated. 
Robert Vaagan was among the passengers and confirms the 
statements of Johansen. 
— We were ordered off the plane and not allowed to take any luggage 
with us. Later we had to give personal details and we were searched. 
Finally we were taken to buses, explains Vaagan.  
 
Taken to reception centre  
After more than an hour waiting in busses, the 90 passengers were 
taken to a reception centre in the military part of Oslo Airport 
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Gardermoen, while security staff searched the plane for suspicious 
objects.  
— We were well received by staff at the reception centre, according to 
Robert Vaagan 
It should be added here that several students in Media and 
communication studies over the last years who have been involved in 
either planning or implementing Exercise Bull, have had internships 
at The Police Directorate. As part of these internships, some have also 
been allowed to complete BA dissertations on assigned topics in crisis 
communication and crisis management (Bredesen 2013). Similarly, 
although this is not in focus in this article, several students not directly 
involved in this type of exercise have also had internships with and 
been employed by the Norwegian armed forces. These students have 
also completed BA dissertations in crisis communication and crisis 
management (Hage 2011, Selvig 2011). 
At Oslo Airport Gardermoen, field reporters had free access to 
WiFi and there was also a press centre. There were restrictions on 
photography at the airport, but military photographers provided a 
photo bank. Along with two 3rd year student volunteers, the author 
was among the 90 passengers on a plane at Oslo Airport Gardermoen 
which the police stormed in order to prevent a suspected hijacking 
(figure 2). 
As in 2006, a questionnaire was distributed by the organizer 
(The Police Directorate) to all participants, including students and 
teachers, as part of an evaluation conducted by The Norwegian 
Police University College. In their 180-page detailed report, 
which is structured in a 3-phase planning, implementation and 
evaluation part, the focus (as in 2006) is on cooperation between 
the key institutional participants and their information and 
communication flows. It must be remembered that insufficient 
cooperation between the police and the military during the 
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22 July 2011 tragedy was a major criticism of several evaluations 
and reports, as we shall see shortly. 
Participants from the security services and military needed 
to withhold classified information that was not included in the 
report. As in 2006, neither the media game, nor Oslo and Akershus 
University College of Applied Sciences nor any other educational 
participants are mentioned, although The Police Directorate 
expressed verbal satisfaction regarding the contribution by 
students and staff in Media and communication studies. Despite 
fewer student participants than in 2006, more news items were 
published and “media pressure” had been kept up. The main 
conclusion in the evaluation report was that although the exercise 
generated invaluable experience and training opportunities for 
most participants, there were shortcomings in the preparations of 
many participants. These had not prepared appropriate criteria to 
measure their performances during the exercise (The Norwegian 
Police University College 2013). Overall, since this exercise was 
conceptualized as the “sharpest” ever and the first after the 
tragedy of 22 July 2011, the results were disappointing to the 
organizers. 
Impact of 22 July 2011 tragedy
The preparations and documentation were, as expected, strongly 
influenced by the tragic events of 22 July 2011 and the ensuing 
public debate over how this tragedy could happen (Stormark 2011, 
Brurås 2012, Lippestad 2013). The main facts are well-known and 
need not be repeated in detail. On 2 July 2011 the terrorist Anders 
Behring Breivik detonated a 900 kilogram fertilizer bomb planted 
in a van which he, due to lax security, was able to park outside the 
main building of the Norwegian government and Prime Minister´s 
Office in the centre of Oslo. Disguised as a policeman, the terrorist 
walked away from the parked van and the explosion that killed 
8 random pedestrians. He then drove off in an escape car to the 
summer holiday camp of the Labour Party youth movement at 
the idyllic Utøya island in lake Tyrifjorden about 1 hour´s drive 
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to the west of Oslo. There he shot and killed another 69 people, 
mostly youngsters, before police special forces arrested him. In 
his 1500-page manifesto which he posted on the Internet and 
sent to around 1,000 recipients just before starting on his killing 
spree, he accused the ruling red-green coalition government, and 
in particular the Labour Party, of ruining Norway by allowing 
Muslim immigration. 
The trial which started in April 2012, lasted 10 weeks and proved to 
be the most mediated trial in Norwegian history. 170 media companies 
and newspapers from all over the world were represented at the 
opening of the trial. The trial proved to be a breakthrough for live-feed 
TV provided by leading Norwegian newspapers. Attempting to use the 
trial as a platform to spread his extreme political and Islamophobic 
views, Behring Breivik was found to be sane after lengthy psychiatric 
evaluations, and sentenced to 21 years´ of preventive detention (with 
the possibility of extension). 
Immediately after 22 July 2012, the Norwegian Prime Minister 
Jens Stoltenberg and his government got massive public support for 
their handling of the crisis. The rose is a symbol of the Labour Party 
in Norway and thousands turned out for peaceful and dignified “rose 
marches” in support of the victims, their families and the government. 
The Prime Minister and his government underlined that Norway was 
an open society and had never wanted massive security measures that 
probably could have stopped the terrorist. Prime Minister Stoltenberg 
and several of his ministers attended the funerals of the victims, 
including the several Muslim victims. 
Yet as evaluations started to appear on how such a tragic event 
could take place, the government came under increasing criticism for 
lack of preparedness and public security. 
A series of reports and evaluations regarding public security 
leading up to the tragedy were completed in 2011-2012 by 
Parliament, several ministries, The Directorate of Health, The 
Directorate of Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, The 
Directorate for Emergency Communication, The Joint Rescue 
Coordination Centres, The National Security Authority, The Police 
Security Service and the police. In November 2011, The Minister of 
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Justice left office and the Ministry was renamed Ministry of Police 
and Public Security. Several top officials in the police also departed 
quietly. Many of the evaluations and reports revealed system 
failure in the gathering, processing and sharing of information, 
in communication and media management. The same conclusions 
were drawn in a White Paper to parliament in June 2012 by the 
Ministry of Justice and Public Security on safety measures in society 
(St.melding 29 (2011–2012) Samfunnssikkerhet). In August 2012, 
a comprehensive and independent report on 22 July 2011, which 
had been commissioned by the Prime Minister’s Office in August 
2011, was presented to the Prime Minister. It offered no less than 
31 specific recommendations of which at least 16 involved how 
to secure better information and communication procedures. Its 
main message was that: 
● The bomb attack on the Government HQ in Oslo city centre 22 
July 2011 could have been stopped if security measures previously 
decided on had been efficiently implemented.
● The ability of the authorities to protect people at Utøya island 
failed. A more prompt police response had been possible. The 
perpetrator could have been stopped earlier on the 22 July. 
● More security and preparedness measures to stop new attacks 
and reduce damage should have been implemented.
● Medical and salvage operations in the acute phase handled the 
wounded and next-of-kin satisfactorily.
 ● Government communication to the public was good. The 
ministries were able to continue their work despite damages. 
● With better work methodology and a broader focus, the Norwegian 
Police Security Service could have detected the perpetrator before 22 
July. The committee could, however, not conclude that The Police 
Security Service could and should have prevented the attacks (NOU 
2012:14 Rapport fra 22.juli kommisjonen).
The report was discussed in parliament in the autumn of 2012 in a 
public hearing of top politicians and civil servants. On 20 March 2013, 
the government’s answer was presented to Parliament as a White 
Paper on preparedness against terror (St. melding 21 (2012–2013) 
Terrorberedskap). 
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In May 2013, the government also presented a toughening of anti-
terror legislation, designed to allow prosecution of “solo” terrorists 
like Anders Behring Breivik. In June 2013, a complete reorganization 
of the Norwegian police was proposed (NOU 2013:9 Politianalysen). 
Taken together, the learning outcomes for students and teachers 
from taking part in these two national anti-terror exercises in 2006 
and 2012 have been considerable (Vaagan 2012). The exercises 
have proven to be “extended classrooms”. The students have gained 
first-hand experience with crisis communication and been involved 
in important exercises. One student was later employed by The 
Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, several got 
internships and wrote BA dissertations on assigned topics in crisis 
communication and crisis management with The Police Directorate. 
The 22 July 2011 tragedy, which was the most mediated event ever 
in Norway, has left a deep imprint on all Norwegians, and by taking 
part in Exercise Bull students and staff have been sensitized to issues 
of public security and civic engagement. 
The students have also received diplomas that can be useful later 
in their careers. From a pedagogical point of view, the exercises 
have been successful and provided students and teachers with 
invaluable real-life role-play. In contrast with 2006, the newsroom 
and news desk experienced editorial freedom and more articles 
were published with a smaller number of students taking part. The 
F i g u r e  5 .  A selection of reports and evaluations following the 22 July 2011 
tragedy
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police have expressed satisfaction with the published articles and 
the “media pressure” which the students were assigned to deliver. 
The few problems that were felt had more to do with coordinating 
with other educational institutions who believed their material 
was not being prioritized. 
On a more critical note, it needs to be said that it is surprising 
that the threat scenario prepared by The Police Security Service 
had not changed significantly in 2012, so shortly after the 22 July 
2011 tragedy. Their main focus remains on Muslim terrorists, 
not on Norwegian right-wing solo extremists like Anders Behring 
Breivik. 
In a wider sense, the reports and evaluations following 22 
July 2011 document that organizational learning from previous 
crises remains limited. Despite crisis exercises, it is difficult for 
key organizations to perform optimally and coordinated during 
crisis situations. The Government’s response to the 22 July has 
been to acknowledge serious system shortcomings and propose 
amendments. The government has acknowledged ultimate 
responsibility for some of the shortcomings uncovered during its 
8-year rule 2005–2013, and many key people from the police left 
office. But the government also distributed much of the blame to 
the police authorities and top-level bureaucracy, while protecting 
the political leaders. In particular, the next-of-kin of the 77  people 
who were killed voiced frustration that no top politician was 
made responsible and had to leave office. Popular demands 
that the Prime Minister must “accept responsibility” and resign 
were answered rhetorically by the Prime Minister that he “took 
responsibility” - by remaining in office! Far from all Norwegians 
were content with this state of affairs and the issue was obviously 
going to play a role in the parliamentary elections in September 
2013. The Labour Party coalition government lost the election 
resoundingly and a new Conservative coalition government took 
office. However, former Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg may 
have emerged relatively unscathed from the 22 July 2011 tragedy: 
In March 2014 it became known that he was to become the new 
Secretary General of NATO from October 2014. 
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Crisis communication theory and practice
Ullmer, Sellnow and Seeger (2011) argue that a wide variety of 
disciplines (psychology, sociology, political science, communication, 
business, mathematics and physics) are engaged in research on crises. 
Much of the literature derives from research on private business 
enterprises and has been adapted to public sector institutions (Coombs 
2007, Ullmer Sellnow and Seeger 2011, Fearn-Banks 2011, Johansen 
and Frandsen 2007). Some of the literature links with a vast corpus of 
research on organizational communication (Lewis 2011, Miller 2011, 
Fincham and Rhodes 2005, Hatch and Cunliffe 2006, Starbuck 2003). 
The contributions from the communication discipline over the last 
two decades can be divided into four broad categories: a) corporate 
apologia, b) image repair theory, c) situational crisis communication 
and d) organizational renewal.
T a b l e  1 
Theories of crisis communication 
(Ullmer, Sellnow and Seeger 2011, p.16)
Theories of crisis communication
Theory Characteristics
Corporate apologia Emphasizes managing the threat created by a persuasive 
attack against an organization
Focuses on apology for wrongdoing
Features communication strategies for the apology
Image repair theory Emphasizes repairing the threat to the image of the ac-
cused
Focuses on accounting for organizational actions that 
caused the crisis
Features communication strategies for managing the ac-
count
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Situational crisis 
communication 
theory
Emphasizes lowering crisis attributions of responsibility 
for the crisis
Focuses on determining communication based upon the 
type of crisis and the organization’s reputational assets
Features flow-chart decision-making process for using 
crisis response strategies to influence stakeholder percep-
tions or attributions of responsibility
Organizational 
renewal theory
Emphasizes opportunities to learn and grow from the 
crisis
Focuses on creating opportunities inherent to crisis events
Features broad leadership and organizational communica-
tion guidelines, emphasizing strong positive values, an 
optimistic forward-looking perspective, and learning to 
overcome the crisis
I have elsewhere argued that Exercise Oslo 2006 was based on an 
analytical paradigm often used in Sweden by the National Board of 
Psychological Defence (Nordlund 2000, Vaagan 2008). The model 
involved a simple triangular communication model where three main 
stakeholders each occupy a corner: a sender (e.g. the government), 
a distributor (primarily the press, radio and TV) and a receiver (the 
public). Democratic systems like the Nordic countries depend on 
the level, quality and balance of mediated, communicated mutual 
trust, confidence and credibility in this equilateral triangle, both in 
peacetime and especially during crises and disasters. Yet in terms of 
communication theory (see e.g. Cappelen 2012, Curran 2010, Heier 
and Kjølberg 2013, Fearn-Banks 2011, Johansen and Frandsen 2007, 
McQuail 2010, Nohrstedt 2011, Street 2011) the triangle used by 
Sweden’s National Board of Psychological Defence fails to reflect the 
composite nature of all three corners. It also says little about symmetric 
and dialogic communication, assuming e.g. that the government is 
the only sender during a crisis. This is often not the case. Today, social 
media used by eyewitnesses are often the first to alert the public of a 
crisis, as we saw during the Boston marathon bombing in April 2013. 
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The triangle came under a cloud during the tsunami crisis in Asia in 
December 2004, when many Swedish and Norwegian tourists died. 
The Swedish and Norwegian governments were subsequently blamed 
for defective crisis communication and management. 
Exercise Bull in 2012, by contrast, seems to have relied more on 
Coombs’ comprehensive 3-phase model with separate phases for 
planning, implementation and evaluation (Coombs 2007). As such, 
this model has elements of image repair theory, situational crisis 
communication theory and organizational renewal theory in table 
1. That this model was used is suggested not only in the evaluation 
report made by The Norwegian Police University College, which 
explicitly uses this 3-phase structure. The 3-phase model is also 
present in The Police Directorate’s handbook in crisis communication 
(Politiet 2010), and can therefore be considered as official police 
strategy for crisis management and communication. More research is 
needed to clarify why this development has taken place. In 2006, the 
exercise was led and designed by The Directorate for Civil Protection 
and Emergency Planning and there were some noticeable problems in 
the cooperation with the police, as specified in the 47-page evaluation 
report. In 2012, the exercise was led by the police, which, as we 
have seen, came under serious criticism over its handling of the 22 
July 2011 tragedy. This may well have influenced the design of the 
exercise, which was the “sharpest” until then. It was also clear that 
the exercise was to be evaluated by an academic institution - The 
Norwegian Police University College, which later published a detailed 
180-page report. This may explain the switch from the reductionist 
triangle model to a more academic and sophisticated model in the 
shape of Coombs 3-phase model. 
Conclusion
Exercise Oslo in 2006 and Exercise Bull in 2012 were both important 
anti-terror exercises involving 40–50 key public institutions and 
between 4,000-5,000 staff from all management levels, including 
the Prime Minister’s Office. Oslo and Akershus University College 
of Applied Sciences took part in both exercises in a minor role with 
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students and staff primarily from Media and communication studies, 
but also from Journalism studies. 260 students and 10 teachers 
participated. Fixed employment and student internships with The 
Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning 
and The Norwegian Police Directorate followed in the wake of Exercise 
Oslo in 2006. In addition, regular lectures in crisis communication 
by practitioners from both institutions were integrated into the 
undergraduate programme in Media and communication studies. 
This confirms the “extended classroom” philosophy and successful 
educator-employer cooperation between The Department of 
Journalism and Media Studies at Oslo and Akershus University 
College of Applied Sciences, The Norwegian Directorate for Civil 
Protection and Emergency Planning and The Norwegian Police 
Directorate. The learning outcomes for students and staff have overall 
been valuable in both exercises. First-hand experience from highly 
prioritized anti-terror exercises, diplomas and by-lined articles and 
several BA dissertations on crisis communication and management 
are useful additions to student CVs and portfolios. 
The planning, implementation and evaluation of Exercise Bull 
in 2012 (the “sharpest” exercise ever) was significantly affected by 
the national tragedy of 22 July 2011 when 77 people were killed 
by a Norwegian terrorist. Nonetheless, the threat scenario by The 
Police Security Service did not change between the two exercises, 
and remains fixed on Muslim terrorists, not on right-wing “solo” 
terrorists. 
Regarding crisis communication theory, there has been progress 
from the reductionist triangle model employed in Exercise Oslo in 
2006 by The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, 
to the more academic and sophisticated Coombsian 3-phase model 
used in Exercise Bull 2012 by The Police Directorate. 
The highly critical evaluation by The Norwegian Police University 
College of Exercise Bull in 2012 strongly indicates that simulated 
exercise events are not taken seriously enough by key participants, 
and that shortcomings persist in information gathering and processing 
as well as in terms of communication and coordination among key 
participants. 
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Медиакомпетентность личности: 
структура и функции
Медиакомпетентность как целевая функция образования 
представляет собой сложный комплекс знаний, умений и на-
выков, конкретный перечень которых зависит как от уровня 
образования (от начального до послевузовского), так и от его 
предметной специфики. В качестве педагогической задачи медиа-
компетентность включена в комплекс медиаобразования, кото-
рое, в широком значении, понимается как подготовка человека 
к жизни и деятельности в современных информационных усло-
виях (постоянное увеличение объема информации и интенсив-
ности ее воздействия, необходимость использования информа-
ционных технологий и т. д.). В узком смысле медиаобразование 
трактуется как подготовка специалиста для работы в медиасфере 
(по созданию текстов, регулированию коммуникаций, медиа-
критике и анализу массовых коммуникаций и др.).
При анализе структуры медиакомпетентности предлагается 
использовать два подхода: анализ взаимодействия личности с 
медиасферой и ролевой анализ медиаповедения. Взаимодей-
ствие личности с медиасферой основано на процессах внешне-
го и внутреннего регулирования этих отношений. Внешнее ре-
гулирование лежит в основе выделения группы нормативных 
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